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How the War Against ISIS 
Changed International Law 
Michael P. Scharf* 
In an effort to destroy ISIS, beginning in August 2014, the 
United States, assisted by a handful of other Western and Arab 
countries, carried out thousands of bombing sorties and cruise 
missile attacks against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. Iraq had 
consented to the airstrikes in its territory, but Syria had not, 
and Russia blocked the UN Security Council from authorizing 
force against ISIS in Syria. The United States invoked several 
different legal arguments to justify its airstrikes, including the 
right of humanitarian intervention, the right to use force in a 
failed state, and the right of hot pursuit, before finally settling 
on self-defense. Use of force in self-defense has traditionally not 
been viewed as lawful against non-state actors in a third state 
unless they are under the effective control of that state, but the 
United States argued that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
by al Qaeda, such force can be justified where a government is 
unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by non-state 
actors operating within its borders. This view was not, however, 
initially accepted by Russia, China, or even the United 
Kingdom. But that changed in the aftermath of ISIS attacks 
against a Russian jetliner and a Paris stadium and concert hall 
in 2015, leading to the unanimous adoption of a UN Security 
Council resolution calling on States to use all necessary 
measures to fight ISIS in Syria without offering a legal basis for 
military action. This article examines the evolution of the right 
to use force in self-defense against non-state actors and makes 
the case that events in 2015 triggered a “Grotian Moment”: a 
fundamental paradigm shift that will have broad implications for 
international law. 
 
* Dean of the Law School, Joseph C. Hostetler-BakerHostetler Professor 
of Law, and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law; former Attorney 
Adviser for United Nations Affairs, U.S. Department of State. The 
author wishes to express special thanks to Kevin Vogel, CWRU Law 
School Class of 2017, for providing research assistance on part II of the 
article. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2014, a militant group calling itself the Islamic State (ISIS)1 
rapidly took over more than thirty percent of the territory of Syria 
and Iraq.2 In the process, it captured billions of dollars worth of oil 
fields and refineries, bank assets and antiquities, tanks and 
armaments, and became one of the greatest threats to peace and 
 
1. ISIS is also known as ISIL and Daesh. 
2. Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, 
Remarks for the Brookings Institution (Sept. 3, 2014) available at 
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/2014-09-
03_remarks_for_the_brookings_institution.pdf (“[t]oday, ISIL has 
more than 10,000 fighters and controls much of the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin—the crossroads of the Middle East—an area similar in size to the 
UK.”). 
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security in the Middle East.3 In an effort to “degrade and defeat” 
ISIS, beginning in August 2014 the United States, assisted by a 
handful of other Western and Arab countries, launched thousands of 
bombing sorties and cruise missile attacks against ISIS targets in Iraq 
and Syria.4 While the Iraqi government has consented to foreign 
military action against ISIS within Iraq, the Syrian government did 
not.5 Rather, Syria protested that the air strikes in Syrian territory 
were an unjustifiable violation of international law.6 
The United States initially claimed the airstrikes against ISIS 
were justified variously by a right of humanitarian intervention, a 
right to use force in the territory of failed states, and a right of hot 
pursuit, before settling on the argument that the airstrikes in Syria 
were lawful acts of collective self-defense on behalf of the government 
of Iraq.7 Use of force in self-defense has traditionally not been viewed 
as lawful against non-state actors in a third state unless they are 
under the effective control of that state,8 but the United States has 
argued that since the 9/11 attacks such force can be justified where a 
government is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the 
 
3. Janine Di Giovanni et al., How does ISIS Fund its Reign of Terror? 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 6, 2014), available at, 
www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-terror-
282607.html [https://perma.cc/3CV2-QVU5]. 
4. Claire Mills et al., ISIS/Daesh: The Military Response in Iraq and 
Syria, House of Commons Briefing Paper No. 06995, Sept. 11, 2015, at 
4-7. 
5. Ben Smith, ISIS and the Sectarian Conflict in the Middle East, House of 
Commons Library Research Paper 15/16, Mar. 19, 2015, at 55 
(demonstrating that the United States did warn the Assad regime about 
the imminent launch of airstrikes in September 2014 but did not request 
the regime’s permission). 
6. Id. 
7. Letter from Samantha J. Power, Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations, to Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of 
the United Nations (Sept. 23, 2014), available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-resolution-article-51-
letters-force-syria-isil-khorasan-group/ [https://perma.cc/2Z37-LHPC]. 
8. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.) (merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 (June 26), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4LN-6EJP]; Oil 
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 195-196 (Nov. 6), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/9715.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6EX-745M][hereinafter Oil Platforms]; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9); Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.  Congo v. Uganda) 
2005 I.C.J. 169 (Dec. 19), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf [https://perma.cc/752C-HYG9] 
[hereinafter Armed Activities]. 
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non-state actors operating within its borders.9 This view was not, 
however, accepted by Russia, China, or even the United Kingdom, 
which initially refused to join the United States in bombing ISIS 
targets in Syria.10 
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for protection of a State’s 
“inherent right” of self-defense.11 Reference to an “inherent right” 
means the question is not one of treaty interpretation but rather 
discerning whether the evolving customary international law 
principles governing self-defense support the U.S. position. Usually, 
customary international law changes slowly over many decades.12 But 
sometimes, world events are such that customary international law 
develops quite rapidly.13 Some scholars call these transformative 
 
9. See Ashley S. Deeks, Unwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative 
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 487 
(2012). 
10. See Smith, supra note 5, at 58; Written Evidence from the Rt Hon 
Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office to the Foreign Affairs Committee on humanitarian intervention 
and the responsibility to protect (Jan. 14, 2014), available at 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/582/
58205.htm [https://perma.cc/4TBS-KAW8]. 
11. U.N.Charter art. 51. 
12. Vincy Fon & Franscesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation 
Theories: An Economic Analysis 3, GEO. MASON UNIV. SCH. L., L. & 
Econ. Working Paper Series No. 2-24 (2000), 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/02-
24.pdf [http://perma.cc/E4HK-PJ3T] (explaining that historically, 
crystallization of new rules of customary international law was viewed as 
a protracted process that took decades, if not centuries, to complete. 
French jurisprudence generally required the passage of at least forty 
years for the emergence of an international custom, while German 
doctrine generally required thirty years) (last visited Feb. 22, 2014); see 
G.I. Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms in 
International Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 419, 420 (1961); Manley O. 
Hudson, Special Rapporteur on Article 24 of the Statute of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary 
International Law More Readily Available, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/16 (Mar. 3, 1950) (the ILC, at the beginning of its work, 
demanded State practice “over a considerable period of time” for a 
customary norm to emerge). 
13. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Merits, 1969 
I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 71, 73–74 (Feb. 20) (explaining that  “Although the passage 
of only a short period of time is not necessarily . . . a bar to the 
formation of a new rule of customary international law . . . an 
indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, 
short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose 
interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and 
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and should 
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition 
that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”); Id. ¶ 74(While 
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events and paradigm shifts14 that accelerate the formation of 
customary international law “International Constitutional 
Moments,”15 likening them to the rapid, radical transformation in 
American Constitutional Law that accompanied the New Deal.16 But 
because these changes occur largely outside a constitution or treaty 
framework, elsewhere I have made the case that a more apt term for 
this phenomenon is “Grotian Moment,” named for Hugo Grotius, the 
15th Century Dutch scholar and diplomat whose masterpiece De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis helped marshal in the modern system of international 
law.17 This article examines whether the use of force against ISIS in 
Syria is one of these so-called Grotian Moments, marking a rapid 
change in customary international law. 
The article begins with background about the nature of the ISIS 
threat and the U.S. decision to launch airstrikes against ISIS in Syria 
 
recognizing that some norms can quickly become customary 
international law, the ICJ held that the equidistance principle contained 
in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf had not 
done so as of 1969 because so few States recognized and applied the 
principle. At the same time, the Court did find that that Articles 1 and 
3 of the Convention (concerning the regime of the continental shelf) did 
have the status of established customary law).  
14. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 150 
(2d ed. 1970) (coining the phrase “paradigm shift”). 
15. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 429, 463 (2003) (Martinez, for example, has written that the 
drafting of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter was a “constitutional 
moment” in the history of international law); Leila Nadya Sadat, Enemy 
Combatants After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Extraordinary Rendition, 
Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1206–07 (2007) (Sadat has similarly described 
Nuremberg as a “constitutional moment for law.”). 
16. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 19 (1984); see 
also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 385, 409 
(1991) (coining the phrase “Constitutional moment”). 
17. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 
(2014) [hereinafter Grotian Moments](noting that the term “Grotian 
Moment” was first coined by Princeton Professor Richard Falk). See 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1265–86 (Burns H. Weston et 
al. eds., Thomson/West 4th ed. 2006) (Grotius (1583–1645) is widely 
considered to have laid the intellectual architecture for the Peace of 
Westphalia, which launched the basic rules of modern international 
law); HEDLEY BULL ET AL., HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 1, 9 (1992) (explaining that while the results of Westphalia 
may have been simplified by the lens of history, and Grotius’ role may 
have been exaggerated, Westphalia has unquestionably emerged as a 
symbolic marker and Grotius as an emblematic figure of changing 
historical thought.”Grotian Moment” is thus an apt label for 
transformational events in customary international law). 
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in August 2014. Next, it discusses the principles and process of 
customary international law formation and the phenomenon of 
accelerated formation of customary international law. Finally, it 
explores the evolution of the legal rationales to justify use of force 
against ISIS in Syria that were espoused by the United States, and 
the international reaction to these arguments, in order to determine 
whether or how the airstrikes and the international response have 
altered international law. 
II. Background on the War on ISIS 
ISIS has its roots in the Sunni/Baathist-dominated Iraqi army of 
Saddam Hussein,18 which was one of the largest armies in the world 
before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.19 After the defeat of the 
Baathist regime, members of the Baathist party were banned from 
participating in the army or other government positions.20 
Dispossessed, marginalized, and subjugated under the U.S. occupation 
and subsequent Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi government of Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the former Sunni army personnel launched a 
protracted rebellion, with the insurgents taking on the name “al-
Qaeda in Iraq” and later changing it to the “Islamic State of Iraq” 
(ISI).21 
Meanwhile, the chaos in Syria, which began as protests against 
the Assad regime in 2011 and escalated to full-out civil war by 2014, 
presented ISI an opportunity to seize territory across the border.22 In 
2014 ISI established its “capital” in the captured Syrian town of al-
Raqqah and changed the group’s name yet again to the “Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS).23 Soon thereafter, ISIS seized nearby Syrian 
oil wells and refineries, providing it with vast financial resources.24 
ISIS then turned its sights on Mosul, the second-largest city in 
Iraq, which fell to ISIS in 2014.25 Following this, ISIS had access to 
 
18. See Smith, supra note 5, at 1, 9.  
19. John M. Broder & Douglas Jehl, Iraqi Army: World’s 5th Largest but 
Full of Vital Weaknesses, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 13, 1990), available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-08-13/news/mn-465_1_iraqi-army 
[https://perma.cc/E525-EHFE] (noting that the Iraqi army was the 5th 
largest in the world). 
20. See Smith, supra note 5, at 9. 
21. Smith, supra note 5, at 1. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 17. 
25. Martin Chulov, Isis insurgents seize control of Iraqi city of Mosul, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014), available at 
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hundreds of millions of dollars from banks, as well as tanks and 
armaments that it captured from the Iraqi army which fled Mosul 
with almost no fight.26 With these vast financial and military 
resources, ISIS began to capture city after city in Iraq and Syria with 
ease. Meanwhile, the Maliki government’s continued suppression of 
the Iraqi Sunnis enabled ISIS to sweep through Sunni areas in Iraq 
without much resistance because of resentment toward the ruling 
regime.27 
Experts believe the majority of top ISIS decision-makers are 
former members of Saddam Hussein’s army, intelligence, and security 
forces.28 But during 2014, the ranks of ISIS swelled with as many as 
10,000 foreign fighters from across the Arab world and Western 
Europe who were attracted to its fundamentalist ideology and string 
of military successes.29 
The name Islamic State reflects the group’s avowed goal to 
establish an Islamic caliphate across the Eastern Mediterranean. In 
the lands it controls, ISIS has imposed repressive edicts and 
conditions on the inhabitants, similar to the Taliban’s former rule in 
Afghanistan. ISIS has beheaded thousands of Christians, Kurds and 
Shi’ites and destroyed Shiite shrines and archeological sites in areas 
under its dominion in Syria and Iraq.30 
ISIS’s strategy of seizing and controlling territory in Iraq and 
Syria distinguishes it from the al-Qaeda network, which has focused 
on attacks on Western interests.31 Due to ISIS’s divergent aims, 
tactics, and its ongoing conflict with the al-Nusra group (which was 
seen as the primary representative of al-Qaeda in Syria), in 2013 
central al-Qaeda leadership disowned ISIS.32 The United States thus 
found itself with three adversaries in the Syrian conflict: The Assad 
government, the al-Nusra (al-Qaeda) group, and ISIS. 
The first U.S. airstrikes against ISIS were in response to a 
humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in northern Iraq in August 2014. 
After capturing nearby Mosul, ISIS forces attacked a number of towns 
in the Sinjar area populated by a Kurdish minority known as the 
Yazadis – killing thousands of men and capturing hundreds of women 
 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-
islamic-militants-seize-control-mosul [https://perma.cc/RD3V-N6JU]. 
26. Smith, supra note 5, at 16-17. 
27. Id.at 24. 
28. Id. at 9. 
29. Id. at 20. 
30. Id. at 11. 
31. Smith, supra note 5, at 12. 
32. Id. at 14. 
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and children as slaves.33 When some 30,000 Yazadis took refuge on 
4,800-foot Mount Sinjar, the ISIS forces cut off their means of egress 
from the mountain.34 At the time, Iraq had not yet given permission 
to the United States to use force in its territory against ISIS, but with 
the Yazadis’ water and food supplies dwindling, President Obama 
authorized airstrikes on the ISIS forces in order to save their lives, 
saying, “When we have the unique capacity to avert a massacre, the 
United States cannot turn a blind eye.”35 
Meanwhile, under U.S. pressure, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki 
stepped down a few days after the Yazadi operation, and was replaced 
by Haidar al-Abadi, who was seen as more moderate and more able to 
begin a reconciliation process with Sunnis.36 At the request of al-
Abadi, the United States launched operation “Inherent Resolve,” 
consisting of widespread airstrikes on ISIS targets in Iraq in August 
2014.37 On September 19, 2014, France joined the United States in 
bombing ISIS in Iraq, and two weeks later the UK joined its two 
NATO allies in engaging in airstrikes in Iraq.38 
Under international law, a State can use military force in another 
State’s territory in three situations: (1) with the latter’s consent, (2) 
with Security Council authorization, or (3) when acting in self-defense 
against an armed attack. Unlike Iraq, Syria has not consented to use 
of force against ISIS by foreign countries (other than Russia) in 
Syrian territory, and the U.S. State Department spokesman stated, 
 
33. Steve Hopkins, Full horror of the Yazidis who didn’t escape Mount 
Sinjar: UN confirms 5,000 men were executed and 7,000 women are 
now kept as sex slaves, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 14, 2014, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2792552/full-horror-yazidis-
didn-t-escape-mount-sinjar-confirms-5-000-men-executed-7-000-women-
kept-sex-slaves.html [http://perma.cc/99WH-GFYW].  
34. Haroon Siddique, 20,000 Iraqis besieged by Isis escape from mountain 
after US air strikes, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2014, 9:12AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/10/iraq-yazidi-isis-
jihadists-islamic-state-kurds [http://perma.cc/2WAR-D7M3]. 
35. Helene Cooper & Michael D. Schear, Militants Seize of Mountain in Iraq 
is Over, Pentagon Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/world/middleeast/iraq-yazidi-
refugees.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/DP69-NY7D]; Helene Cooper, 
Mark Landler& Alissa J. Rubin, Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on 
ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-
military-strikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/693E-LYVH]. 
36. Smith, supra note 5, at 24. 
37. See Mills, supra note 4, at 6. 
38. See Smith, supra note 5, at 51-52. 
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“We’re not looking for the approval of the Syrian regime.”39 At the 
same time, with its permanent member veto, Russia blocked Security 
Council authorization to use force in Syria.40 Russia has long been a 
strong ally of the Assad regime, which allows Russia to keep its only 
naval base outside the former Soviet Union at the Syrian 
Mediterranean port of Tartus.41 Russia also seems motivated by the 
goal of frustrating U.S. policy in the Mideast.42 The Russian Foreign 
Ministry has said that without a Security Council resolution, any 
strike against Syria would constitute an unlawful act of aggression.43 
Nevertheless, without Syrian consent or Security Council 
authorization, on September 23, 2014, the United States began 
airstrikes on ISIS targets in Syria, supported by Bahrain, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.44 Later, in February 2015 and April 
2015, Jordan and Canada, respectively, joined the airstrikes against 
ISIS in Syria.45 U.S. aircraft participating in the strikes included F-15, 
F-16, F/A-18, F-22 fighter aircraft and B-1 bombers, as well as 
Tomahawk missiles deployed from US naval vessels in the Red Sea 
and North Arabian Gulf.46 
From August 2014 through August 2015, the U.S.-led coalition 
had conducted more than 5,500 airstrikes on ISIS targets in Iraq and 
Syria, resulting in the deaths of over 15,000 ISIS fighters.47 Despite 
 
39. See generally Mills, supra note 4, at 55 (describing how the United 
States did warn the Assad regime about the imminent launch of 
airstrikes in September 2014 but did not request the regime’s 
permission). 
40. Syria resolution authorizing military force fails in U.N. Security 
Council, CBS NEWS (Aug. 28 2013, 4:48 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-resolution-authorizing-military-
force-fails-in-un-security-council/ [http://perma.cc/3ZGZ-96HM]. 
41. Smith, supra note 5, at 42. 
42. Smith, supra note 5, at 14.   
43. Somini Sengupta, A Host of Possible Objections to Expanded Airstrikes 
in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/world/middleeast/a-host-of-
possible-objections-to-expanded-airstrikes.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/U5NT-ET95]. 
44. Julian E. Barnes & Dion Nissenbaum, U.S., Arab Allies Launch 
Airstrikes Against Islamic State Targets in Syria, WALL ST. J., 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/us-arab-allies-launch-airstrikes-against-
islamic-state-targets-in-syria-1411436642 [http://perma.cc/HF7M-
RGTJ]. 
45. Mills, supra note 4, at 10-11. 
46. Smith, supra note 5, at 53. 
47. Jim Michaels, 15,000 Killed, but ISIS Persists, USA TODAY (July 30, 
2015, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/07/29/air-campaign-
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American and British commanders’ claims of success,48 ISIS’s forces 
reportedly grew to over 31,500 during the period of bombing, with a 
steady influx of recruits from around the world replacing ISIS 
casualties, suggesting that the war against ISIS is likely to be a 
lengthy one.49 
Then, on October 31, 2015, ISIS bombed a Russian jetliner over 
the Sinai desert, killing 224 passengers, and followed that up on 
November 13, 2015, by attacking a rock concert and sporting event in 
Paris, killing 130 and injuring 368 people.50 In response, on December 
2, 2015, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
2249, which determined that ISIS is “a global and unprecedented 
threat to international peace and security,” and called for “all 
necessary measures” to “eradicate the safe haven [ISIS] established” in 
Syria.51   
III. The Concept of Accelerated Formation of 
Customary International Law 
Professor Myers McDougle of Yale Law School famously described 
the customary international law formation process as one of 
continuous claim and response.52 To illustrate this process, consider 
the question of whether international law permits a State to use force 
to arrest a terrorist leader in another State without the latter’s 
consent—a question that recently arose when the United States 
kidnapped an al-Qaeda leader from Libya in October 2013.53 The 
 
kills-15000-isis-militants-pentagon-iraq-syria/30750327/ 
[http://perma.cc/6P6X-WR9L]. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See Armin Rosen, ISIS pulled off 2 of its most alarming attacks in the 
space of less than a month, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015, 8:01 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-paris-plane-attacks-2015-11 
[https://perma.cc/9M3M-3P9A] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015); Adam 
Chandler et al., The Paris Attacks: The Latest, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 
2015, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/paris-
attacks/415953/ [https://perma.cc/NM9A-F695] (last visited Feb. 19, 
2016). 
51. See S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015), available at 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12132.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4GZM-WEYC] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015). 
52. See generally Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen 
Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L. J. 
648 (1955). 
53. See Ernesto Londoño, Capture of Bombing Suspect in Libya Represents 
Rare ‘Rendition’ by U.S. Military, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2013), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-10-
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claim may be express, such as demanding that its special forces be 
allowed to enter the territorial State to arrest the terrorist, or 
implicit, such as sending its special forces into the territorial State 
without its permission to apprehend the terrorist. The response to the 
claim may in turn be favorable, such as consenting to the operation or 
refraining from protesting the extraterritorial apprehension. In such 
case, the claim and response will begin the process of generating a 
new rule of customary international law. Some States may imitate the 
practice and others may passively acquiesce to it. 
A “custom pioneer” (the first State to initiate a new practice) has 
no guarantee that its action will actually lead to the formation of a 
binding custom. Indeed, the response may be a repudiation of the 
claim, as in the case of Libya’s protest of the un-consented 
apprehension of the al-Qaeda operative.54 In such case, the 
repudiation could constitute a reaffirmation of existing law, which is 
strengthened by the protest. Or, the claim and repudiation could 
constitute a stalemate, which could decelerate the formation of new 
customary international law. The reaction of third States is also 
relevant. Out of this process of claim and response, and third party 
acquiescence or repudiation, rules emerge or are superseded. Just “as 
pearls are produced by the irritant of a piece of grit entering an 
oyster’s shell, so the interactions and mutual accommodations of 
States produce the pearl—so to speak—of customary law.”55 Usually, 
this process of customary international law formation takes many 
decades.56 But sometimes, world events are such that customary 
international law develops quite rapidly.57 
 
06/world/42771116_1_kerry-terrorism-suspects-libyan-government 
[http://perma.cc/KYV5-H8UF] (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
54. Id. 
55. MAURICE H. MENDELSON, THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (1998).  
56. Fon & Parisi, supra note 12 (affirming that historically, crystallization 
of new rules of customary international law was viewed as a protracted 
process that took decades, if not centuries, to complete.  French 
jurisprudence generally required the passage of at least forty years for 
the emergence of an international custom, while German doctrine 
generally required thirty years); see Tunkin, supra note 12, at 420; 
Manley O. Hudson, Special Rapporteur on Article 24 of the Statute of 
the Int’l Law Comm’n, Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of 
Customary International Law More Readily Available, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/16 (Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Working Paper, 1950) (stating that 
the ILC, at the beginning of its work, demanded State practice “over a 
considerable period of time” for a customary norm to emerge). 
57. The Court stated: “Although the passage of only a short period of time 
is not necessarily . . . a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law . . . an indispensable requirement would be that within 
the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, 
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In domestic law, we know what stages legislation needs to go 
through and how many votes are needed at each stage for a bill to 
become a law. Likewise for international conventions, we know what 
formalities must be undertaken for a text to become a treaty and the 
number of ratifications required to bring it into force. In contrast, 
there exists no agreed upon formula for identifying with precision how 
many States are needed and how much time must transpire to 
generate a rule of customary international law.58 
Professor Maurice Mendelson, the Chair of the ILA’s Customary 
International Law Committee, suggests that such a formula is 
unnecessary. Using the metaphor of building a house, he points out 
that it is often difficult or even impossible to say exactly when 
construction has reached the point that we can conclude a house has 
been created.59 It is neither when the first foundation stone is laid nor 
when the last brush of paint has been applied, but somewhere 
between the two. As Mendelson puts it, “[d]o we have to wait for the 
roof to go on, for the windows to be put in, or for all of the utilities to 
be installed? So it is with customary law.”60 Rarely does a decision 
maker need to know the exact moment that a practice has crystallized 
into a binding rule, or as Mendelson puts it, “precisely when the fruit 
became ripe.”61 Instead, he concludes, “we are more interested in 
knowing, when we bite it, if it is now ripe or still too hard or sour.”62 
Mendelson’s metaphor is apt, for example, in examining when the 
continental shelf concept became customary international law. 
 
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should 
have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the 
provision invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such a way as 
to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved.” North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), 
Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 71, 73–74 (Feb. 20, 1969) [hereinafter North 
Sea Continental Shelf]; While recognizing that some norms can quickly 
become customary international law, the ICJ held that the equidistance 
principle contained in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf had not done so as of 1969 because so few States 
recognized and applied the principle.  At the same time, the Court did 
find that that Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention (concerning the regime 
of the continental shelf) did have the status of established customary 
law. Id. at ¶ 74. 
58. ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 
(1971) (noting that there is no consensus as to how much time a 
practice must be maintained to evidence the existence of a custom); 
Tunkin, supra note 12, at 420 (arguing that the element of time is not 
dispositive as to whether a customary rule exists). 
59. See MENDELSON, supra note 55, at 175. 
60. See MENDELSON, supra note 55, at 175. 
61. MENDELSON, supra note 55, at 176. 
62. MENDELSON, supra note 55, at 176. 
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President Truman proclaimed the continental shelf concept in 1945; 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf recognized this 
entitlement on the part of coastal States, and in 1969 the ICJ 
acknowledged that the principle was part of customary international 
law in North Sea Continental Shelf.63 Somewhere during those twenty-
four years between 1945 and 1969, the coastal States’ rights over the 
continental shelf had crystallized into customary international law, 
but it would be difficult to pinpoint the exact moment that occurred. 
Sometimes courts or international organizations need to determine 
more definitively when an emerging norm has ripened into binding 
customary international law. The Cambodia Tribunal’s determination 
of whether the Nuremberg trial established Joint Criminal Enterprise 
(JCE) liability as a principle of customary international law is 
illustrative. 64 
A. Nuremberg as a Grotian Moment 
JCE is a form of liability somewhat similar to the Anglo-
American “felony murder rule”65 and the “Pinkerton rule,”66 in which 
a person who willingly participates in a criminal enterprise can be 
held criminally responsible for the reasonably foreseeable acts of other 
members of the criminal enterprise even if those acts were not part of 
the plan. Although few countries around the world apply principles of 
co-perpetration similar to the felony murder rule or Pinkerton rule, 
since the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the International 
 
63. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J.  3; White House News Release, 
President Truman’s Proclamations on U.S. Policy Concerning Natural 
Resources of Sea Bed and Fisheries on High Seas (Sept. 28, 1945), 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/post-war/1945-09-28a.html 
[http://perma.cc/4MXC-FRSK]. 
64. Case of Ieng Sary, Ieng Sary’s Motion against the Application at the 
ECCC of the Form of Responsibility Known as Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, 28 July, 2008, ERN 
00208225-00208240, D97 (The Defense Motion argued in part that JCE 
III as applied by the Tadic decision of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY] Appeals Chamber is a 
judicial construct that does not exist in customary international law or, 
alternatively, did not exist in 1975–79); Co-Prosecutors’ Supplementary 
Observations on Joint Criminal Enterprise, Case of Ieng Sary, No. 
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, 31 December 2008; see also Order on the 
Application at the ECCC of the Form of Liability Known as Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (Dec. 8, 
2009) (recognizing JCE as customary international law applicable to the 
ECCC). 
65. See generally David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the 
Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 359 (1985). 
66. See generally Matthew A. Pauley, The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder, 
4 PIERCE L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the 1998 Tadic case,67 
it has been accepted that JCE is a mode of liability applicable to 
international criminal trials. Dozens of cases before the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Panels for the Trial of 
Serious Crimes in East Timor, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
have recognized and applied JCE liability during the last ten years. 
These modern precedents, however, were not directly relevant to 
the Cambodia Tribunal because the crimes under its jurisdiction had 
occurred some twenty years earlier. Under the international law 
principle of nulem crimin sine lege (the equivalent to the U.S. 
Constitution’s ex post facto law prohibition), the Cambodia Tribunal 
could only apply the substantive law and associated modes of liability 
that existed as part of customary international law in 1975. Therefore, 
a critical question before the Cambodia Tribunal was whether the 
Nuremberg Tribunal precedent and the UN’s adoption of the 
“Nuremberg Principles” were sufficient to establish JCE liability as 
part of customary international law following World War II. 
The attorneys for the Khmer Rouge Defendants argued that 
Nuremberg and its progeny provided too scant a sampling to 
constitute the widespread state practice and opinio juris required to 
establish JCE as a customary norm as of 1975.68 In response, the 
Prosecution brief maintained that Nuremberg constituted an instance 
in which there is such a fundamental change to the international 
system that a new principle of customary international law can arise 
with exceptional velocity. Despite the dearth of State practice, the 
Cambodia Tribunal ultimately found JCE applicable to its trials 
based on the Nuremberg precedent and UN General Assembly 
endorsement of the Nuremberg Principles.69 
While the Nuremberg trials were not without criticism, there can 
be no question that Nuremberg represented a paradigm-shifting 
development in international law. The International Law Commission 
(ILC) has recognized that the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment gave 
birth to the entire international law paradigm of individual criminal 
 
67. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
68. For the definition of “customary international law,” see North Sea 
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. ¶ 77. 
69. Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges’ Order on 
Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), Ieng et al. (002/10-09-2007-
ECCC/TC), Trial Chamber (June 17, 2011) (discussing how in Case 
002, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber later confirmed that JCE I and JCE 
II reflected customary international law as of 1976, but questioned 
whether JCE III was actually applied at Nuremberg, and therefore was 
not applicable to the ECCC trial). 
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responsibility.70 Prior to Nuremberg, the only subjects of international 
law were States, and what a State did to its own citizens within its 
own borders was its own business. Nuremberg fundamentally altered 
that conception. As Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White 
observed, “[i]nternational law now protects individual citizens against 
abuses of power by their governments [and] imposes individual 
liability on government officials who commit grave war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity.”71 The ILC has described the 
principle of individual responsibility and punishment for crimes under 
international law recognized at Nuremberg as the “cornerstone of 
international criminal law” and the “enduring legacy of the Charter 
and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.”72 
Importantly, on December 11, 1946, in one of the first actions of 
the newly formed United Nations, the UN General Assembly 
unanimously affirmed the principles from the Nuremberg Charter and 
judgments in Resolution 95(I).73 This General Assembly Resolution 
 
70. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the Grotian Moment: Accelerated Formation 
of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 439, 454 (2010), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1765&con
text=cilj [http://perma.cc/UB8Y-7UZ8]. 
71. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International 
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 13 (2002). 
72. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of its Forty-Eighth 
Session, 51st Sess., May 6–July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/10; GAOR, 
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996), http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/236/37/img/N9623637.pdf?OpenEle
ment [http://perma.cc/L6QY-BRYK]. 
73. G.A. Res. 95 (I) A/236 at 1144, Affirmation of the Principles of 
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal 
(Dec. 11, 1946), http://www.un-documents.net/a1r95.htm 
[http://perma.cc/3FGH-LHQ6]; The Resolution states in whole:  
 The General Assembly,  
 Recognizes the obligation laid upon it by Article 13, paragraph 1, sub-
paragraph a, of the Charter, to initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification; Takes note of the 
Agreement for the establishment of an International Military Tribunal 
for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis signed in London on 8 August 1945, and of the Charter 
annexed thereto, and of the fact that similar principles have been 
adopted in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the 
trial of the major war criminals in the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo on 
19 January 1946; 
 Therefore,  
 Affirms the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal; Directs the 
Committee on the codification of international law established by the 
resolution of the General Assembly of 11 December 1946, to treat as a 
matter of primary importance plans for the formulation, in the context 
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had all the attributes of a resolution entitled to great weight as a 
declaration of customary international law: It was labeled an 
“affirmation” of legal principles; it dealt with inherently legal 
questions; it was passed by a unanimous vote; and none of the 
members expressed the position that it was merely a political 
statement.74 
Despite the fact that Nuremberg and its Control Council Law 
#10 progeny consisted of only a dozen separate cases tried by a 
handful of courts over a period of just three years, the ICJ,75 the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,76 the 
European Court of Human Rights,77 and several domestic courts78 
have cited the General Assembly Resolution affirming the principles 
of the Nuremberg Charter and judgments as an authoritative 
declaration of customary international law. 
 
of a general codification of offenses against the peace and security of 
mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, of the principles 
recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the judgment 
of the Tribunal. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 172, ¶ 89 
(July 9). 
76. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Opinion and Judgment, Trial 
Chamber, ¶ 623 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 
1997); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶141 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
77. The European Court of Human Rights recognized the “universal 
validity” of the Nuremberg principles in Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia, 
which stated:  
 Although the Nuremberg Tribunal was established for trying the major 
war criminals of the European Axis countries for the offences they had 
committed before or during the Second World War, the Court notes 
that the universal validity of the principles concerning crimes against 
humanity was subsequently confirmed by, inter alia, resolution 95 of the 
United Nations General Assembly (11 December 1946) and later by the 
International Law Commission. 
 See Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, App. No. 23052/04, 24018/04, Eur. Ct. 
H.R., 8 (2006). 
78. See R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.) (describing how the General 
Assembly resolution affirming the Nuremberg Principles has been cited 
as evidence of customary international law in cases in Canada, Bosnia, 
France, and Israel); see generally Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation 
of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From 
Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289 
(1994-1995) (summarizing the Touvier and Barbie cases in French 
courts). 
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Nuremberg, then, constitutes a prototypical Grotian Moment. 
The Tribunal’s formation was in response to the most heinous 
atrocity in the history of humankind—the extermination of six million 
Jews and several million other “undesirables” by the Nazi regime. 
From a conventional view of customary international law formation, 
the amount of State practice was quite limited, consisting only of the 
negotiation of the Nuremberg Charter by four States, its accession by 
nineteen others, the judgment of the Tribunal, and a General 
Assembly Resolution endorsing (though not enumerating) its 
principles.79 Moreover, the time period from the end of the war to the 
General Assembly endorsement of the Nuremberg Principles was a 
mere year: a drop in the bucket compared to the amount of time it 
ordinarily takes to crystallize customary international law.Yet, despite 
the limited state practice and minimal time, the ICJ, European Court 
of Human Rights, and four international criminal tribunals have 
confirmed that the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment immediately 
ripened into customary international law. 
The Grotian Moment concept rationalizes this outcome. 
Nuremberg reflected a novel solution to unprecedented atrocity in the 
context of history’s most devastating war. Beyond the Nuremberg 
trial, there was a great need for universal implementation of the 
Nuremberg Principles. Yet, on the eve of the Cold War, it was clear 
that a widely ratified multilateral convention would not be a 
practicable near term solution. In fact, it would take half a century 
before the international community was able to conclude a widely 
ratified treaty transforming the Nuremberg model into a permanent 
international criminal court. It is this context of fundamental change 
and great need for a timely response that explains how Nuremberg 
could so quickly and universally be accepted as customary 
international law. 
B. Other Examples of Grotian Moments since World War II 
As the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law has 
observed, “recent developments show that customary rules may come 
into existence rapidly.”80 The venerable publication goes on to 
explain:  
This can be due to the urgency of coping with new 
developments of technology, such as, for instance, drilling 
technology as regards the rules on the continental shelf, or space 
 
79. Grotian Moments, supra note 17, at 67-68. 
80. Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law ¶ 24 (2006), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1393?rskey=Vf48S0&result=4&prd=EPIL 
[http://perma.cc/3FGH-LHQ6]. 
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technology as regards the rule on the freedom of extra-
atmospheric space. Or it may be due to the urgency of coping 
with widespread sentiments of moral outrage regarding crimes 
committed in conflicts such as those in Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
that brought about the rapid formation of a set of customary 
rules concerning crimes committed in internal conflicts.81 
Let us examine each of these examples in turn, beginning with the 
rapid formation of the law of the continental shelf. In 1945, U.S. 
President Truman issued a proclamation that the resources on the 
continental shelf off the coast of the United States belonged to the 
United States.82 This represented a major departure from the existing 
customary international law of the sea, under which the seabed 
outside of 12 nautical miles was considered free for exploitation by 
any State.83 The Proclamation was driven by technological 
developments enabling exploitation of offshore oil and gas supplies 
and the intense post-war demand for such resources for a rebuilding 
world.84 Though the United States recognized that it was acting as a 
custom pioneer,85 it was careful to couch its justification in legal terms 
that would render the action easier to accept and replicate by other 
States. Despite the far-reaching change it represented, the Truman 
Proclamation was met with no protest;86 rather, within five years, half 
of the world’s coastal States had made similar claims to the resources 
of their continental shelves,87 leading commentators to declare that 
the continental shelf concept had become virtually instant customary 
international law.88 By 1969, the ICJ had confirmed that the Truman 
Declaration quickly generated customary international law binding on 
States that had not ratified the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention.89 
 
81. Id. 
82. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945), available 
at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_proc_2667.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/T7QL-K6Q2]. 
83. BARRY BUZAN, SEABED POLITICS 8 (Praeger Publishers, 1976). 
84. JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE 1982 TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES 4 
(McFarland & Co., 1992); id.at 7. 
85. Cf. ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 30 
(Princeton Univ. Press, 1981) (citing Unpublished, National Archives 
Record Group 48) (analogizing President Truman’s ingenuity). 
86. BUZAN, supra note 83. 
87. MORELL, supra note 84, at 2. 
88. Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 Brit. Y.B. 
Int’l 376, 393 (1950). 
89. North Sea Continental Shelf , 1969 I.C.J. 3, 33-34, ¶ 47. 
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Next, let us examine the formation of outer space law, which 
rapidly emerged from the great leaps in rocket technology in the 
1960s, led by the Soviet Union and the United States, inaugurating 
the era of space flight. Rather than treat outer space like the high 
seas (open to unregulated exploitation), the international community 
embraced a unique set of rules to govern this new area as codified in 
the General Assembly Declaration on Outer Space, which was 
unanimously approved in 1963.90 Though the amount of State practice 
was limited to a few dozen space flights launched by two States and 
the lack of protest by the States over which these rockets passed, 
States and scholars have concluded that the 1963 Declaration 
represented an authoritative statement of customary international law 
that rapidly formed in response to new technologies requiring a new 
international law paradigm.91 
Finally, let us turn to the customary international law that 
rapidly emerged from the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the 1990s. The 
establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal was made possible because 
of a unique constellation of events at the end of the Cold War, which 
included the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia’s assumption of the 
Soviet seat in the Security Council, and the return of genocide to 
Europe for the first time since Nazi Germany. In its inaugural case, 
the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal rendered a 
revolutionary decision that for the first time held that individuals 
could be held criminally liable for violations of Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions for war crimes 
committed in internal conflict.92 This decision closed a gaping gap in 
the coverage of international humanitarian law and was soon 
thereafter affirmed by the Rwanda Tribunal93 and Special Court for 
 
90. G.A. Res. 18 (XVIII) A, Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 
1962),  http://www.un-documents.net/a18r1962.htm 
[http://perma.cc/EC7T-LQTN].  
91. MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 138 (A.W. Sijthoff Int’l Publ’g Co. 1972). 
92. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 89 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
93. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995). 
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Sierra Leone.94 It was codified in the 1998 Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which has been ratified by 123 States.95 
These case studies suggest that the Grotian Moment concept has 
several practical applications. It can explain the rapid formation of 
customary rules in times of rapid flux, thereby imbuing those rules 
with greater repute. It can counsel governments when to seek the 
path of a UN General Assembly resolution or non-binding Security 
Council resolution as a means of facilitating the formation of 
customary international law, and how to craft such a resolution to 
ensure that it is viewed as a capstone in the formation of such 
customary rules. It can, in apt circumstances, strengthen the case for 
litigants arguing the existence of a new customary international rule. 
It can also furnish international courts with the confidence to 
recognize new rules of customary international law in appropriate 
cases despite a relative paucity and short duration of State practice. 
At the same time, one must approach the Grotian Moment 
concept with caution. As one author warns, “[i]t is always easy, at 
times of great international turmoil, to spot a turning point that is 
not there.”96 With this admonition in mind, the next section examines 
whether the customary international law governing use of force 
against non-state actors in self-defense has undergone rapid 
transformation since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
IV. The Changing Law of Self-Defense against Non-
State Actors 
The United States’ legal rationale for its military actions in Syria 
is encapsulated in the September 23, 2014 letter to the United 
Nations from the Permanent Representative of the United States. The 
letter states: 
Iraq has made clear that it is facing a serious threat of 
continuing attacks from ISIL coming out of safe havens in Syria. 
These safe havens are used by ISIL for training, planning, 
financing, and carrying out attacks across Iraqi borders and 
against Iraq’s people. For these reasons, the Government of Iraq 
 
94. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 2002 Art. 3, 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q77F-49RK]. 
95. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 ¶ 2(b)-(f)) 
(Rome, 17 July 1998) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002 (distinguishing between “international armed 
conflict” in paragraph 2(b) and “armed conflict not of an international 
character” in paragraphs 2(c)-(f)). 
96. Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The 
Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 30 (2004). 
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has asked that the United States lead international efforts to 
strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Syria in order to 
end the continuing attacks on Iraq, to protect Iraqi citizens, and 
ultimately to enable and arm Iraqi forces to perform their task 
of regaining control of the Iraqi borders. 
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to 
Iraq, but also to many other countries, including the United 
States and our partners in the region and beyond. States must 
be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the case here, the 
government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling 
or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks. 
The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not 
confront these safe-havens effectively itself. Accordingly, the 
United States has initiated necessary and proportionate military 
actions in Syria in order to eliminate the ongoing ISIL threat to 
Iraq, including by protecting Iraqi citizens from further attacks 
and by enabling Iraqi forces to regain control of Iraq’s borders.97 
As outlined in this communication, the United States has argued 
that it can attack ISIS targets in Syria without Syria’s consent 
because (i) ISIS threatens Iraq, (ii) Iraq has requested the United 
States’ assistance, (iii) ISIS has obtained safe havens in Syria, and 
(iv) the government of Syria has been unable to confront ISIS 
effectively. 
Notably, the United States has not argued that Syria effectively 
controls ISIS, and as such its argument is a departure from the 
traditional view proclaimed by the International Court of Justice in 
the 1986 Nicaragua Case that victim States may not resort to force in 
response to attacks by non-State actors unless those actors were 
effectively controlled by the territorial State.98 This section examines 
whether the systematic al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the subsequent 
attacks by ISIS against the Russian airliner and Paris concert hall 
and stadium in October and November 2015, and the international 
community’s political and tactical reactions to those attacks, 
generated a Grotian Moment, leading to a new rule of customary 
international law concerning use of force against non-state actors 
including ISIS. 
 
97. Letter from Samantha J. Power, supra note 7.  
98. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6MW-WZ5K]. 
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A. Use of Force against Non-State Actors Prior to 9/11 
Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, State sovereignty has been 
regarded as the fundamental paradigm of international law. Leading 
scholars have described the prohibition of the threat or use of force in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as “the corner-stone of the Charter 
system.”99 The customary international law right to use force in self-
defense as an exception to Article 2(4) is codified in Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. The Charter recognizes an important limit to that right, 
however, permitting use of force in self-defense only “if an armed 
attack occurs.”100 The UN Charter does not define “armed attack,” 
but the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case held 
that only the “most grave forms of the use of force” constitute an 
armed attack.101According to the ICJ, to qualify as an armed attack 
triggering the right of self-defense, the assault must reach a certain 
significant scale of violence above “mere frontier incidents.”102 
However, the ICJ has also suggested that a string of small-scale 
attacks can in aggregate constitute an armed attack.103 Assuming that 
the attack threshold is reached either by a particularly serious 
terrorist attack or by a series of attacks, two questions arise: first, 
whether the armed attack must be attributable to the State against 
whom the force will be used; and second, whether targeting terrorists 
before they launch a new attack is lawful. 
1. State Attribution 
The International Court of Justice has repeatedly held that unless 
the acts of non-state actors are attributable to the territorial State, 
use of force against non-state actors in that State is unlawful.104 This 
is because when a rebel group or terrorist organization is physically 
located within the territory of another State that is not in effective 
control of its operations, the right of self-defense collides with two 
 
99. JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 414 (Oxford Univ. Press, 6th ed. 1963); 
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 732 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 7th ed. 2008). 
100. U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
101. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, at ¶ 191. 
102. Id. at ¶ 195. 
103. See generally Id.at ¶¶ 119-120, 130-132; see also Armed Activities, supra 
note 8, at ¶ 146 (“[E]ven if this series of deplorable attacks could be 
regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained non-
attributable to the DRC”). 
104. See generally Nicar. V. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14 (holding that the United 
States unlawfully used force against another state); Armed Activities, 
supra note 8, at ¶¶ 28-166 (holding unlawful use of force and violation 
of territorial sovereignty).   
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other fundamental principles of international law: the sovereign 
equality of States and the renunciation of force in international 
relations.105 The rationale behind the attribution requirement is that a 
state cannot be held responsible for the acts of all whose activities 
originate in its territory.106 “If it were otherwise, Colombia, for 
example, might be liable for the acts of international drug traffickers 
working from Colombia, or Russia might be held responsible for the 
international activities of the ‘Russian Mafia.’”107 Thus, under the 
ICJ’s holdings in Nicaragua,108 Oil Platforms,109 The Wall Advisory 
Opinion,110 and the Congo case,111 to use force against a terrorist 
organization whose conduct is not imputable to the territorial State 
would itself constitute an unlawful armed attack, warranting justified 
use of force in response by the territorial State. 
Under the International Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, 
attribution requires that the territorial State have “effective control” 
of the non-state actors.112 This standard comes from the Nicaragua 
Case, where the Court was presented with the question of whether 
the actions of Nicaragua in supporting rebels in El Salvador through 
the provision of weapons was sufficient to justify military action by 
the United States in collective self-defense with El Salvador.113 The 
Court stated that sending “armed bands” into the territory of another 
State would be sufficient to constitute an armed attack, but “the 
supply of arms and other support to such bands cannot be equated 
with an armed attack.”114 In the same case, the ICJ found that the 
acts of the U.S.-assisted Nicaraguan rebel group called the “Contras“ 
could not be attributed to the United States because there was no 
 
105. U.N. Charter art. 2, at paras. 1, 4. 
106. Grotian Moments, supra note 17, at 185. 
107. Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and 
the Use of Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 97, 104 (2003). 
108. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 195. 
109. Oil Platforms, supra note 8. 
110. The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) (“Article 51 of the 
Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence 
in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. 
However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable 
to a foreign State….[T]herefore Israel could not in any event invoke 
those resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-
defence”). 
111. Armed Activities, supra note 8, at ¶ 162-165. 
112. Grotian Moments, supra note 17, at 185. 
113. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 229. 
114. Id. at ¶ 247. 
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clear evidence that the United States had “exercised such a degree of 
control in all fields as to justify treating the Contras as acting on its 
behalf.”115 It is important to note here that the Nicaragua attribution 
requirement was not designed to answer the question of whether an 
attack by an independent non-state actor could trigger the right to 
use force in self-defense against that non-state actor, but rather the 
question of whether an attack by the non-state actor could be 
considered an armed attack by the State that sent the armed groups 
and therefore justify force in self-defense against that State. 
2. Anticipatory Self-Defense under Customary International Law 
Anticipatory self-defense is the use of force to stop an attack that 
has not actually commenced but which is reasonably believed to be 
imminent. The concept recognizes that “no State can be expected to 
await an initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may 
well destroy the State’s capacity for further resistance and so 
jeopardize its very existence.”116 Anticipatory self-defense has its 
customary international law origins in the notorious Caroline incident 
of 1837.117 
During the Caroline incident, Canada (then part of the United 
Kingdom) faced an armed insurrection mounted from U.S. territory 
led by non-state actors.118 The United Kingdom responded to the 
armed insurrection by attacking the insurgent’s supply ship, the 
Caroline, while it was docked on the U.S. side of the Niagara River. 
In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States 
Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, and the British Foreign Minister, 
Lord Ashburton, the two sides agreed that a State would be justified 
in using force against non-state actors in another State where the 
“necessity for self defense” was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”119 While courts and 
commentators often substitute the term “imminent” for the longer 
formulation, the Caroline definition is widely recognized as reflecting 
customary international law. 
 
115. Id. at ¶ 109. 
116. D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-92 (1958). 
117. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Preemptive Use of 
Military Force, WASH. Q. 89, 90 (2003). 
118. Hunter Miller, British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, 
AVALON PROJECT (Sep. 26, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp 
[https://perma.cc/X44G-Q7KR]. 
119. Letter from Daniel Webster, US Secretary of State, to Mr. Fox (April 
24, 1841), 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (James 
Rigway & Sons 1857). 
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B. Did the 9/11 Attacks Alter the Paradigm? 
When the rules governing use of force in self-defense were 
promulgated, most international conflicts were conducted by States 
utilizing large movements of military personnel and munitions.120 In 
the past, non-state actors (pirates, guerrillas, drug traffickers, and 
terrorists) appeared less threatening to state security than the well-
funded, well organized, and potent armed forces of an enemy State. 
To the extent that terrorists were a concern, it was because they were 
financed by State supporters, such as Iran, Sudan, and Syria.121 The 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed that perception by 
starkly illustrating that small groups of non-state actors, acting from 
failed States without direct government support, “can exploit 
relatively inexpensive and commercially available technology to 
conduct very destructive attacks over great distances.”122 
1. A Different Kind of Threat 
In August 1996, Osama bin Laden, the multi-millionaire leader of 
a then little known group called al-Qaeda, issued a statement entitled 
“Ladenese Epistle: Declaration of War,” in which he called for all 
Muslims to make holy war (jihad) against American forces in Saudi 
Arabia, and specifically advocated the use of terrorist with the goal of 
“great losses induced on the enemy side (that would shaken and 
destroy its foundations and infrastructures).”123 In February 1998, bin 
Laden followed the Declaration of War by issuing a religious edict 
(fatwa) to all Muslims, declaring that “to kill the Americans and their 
 
120. At the time of the adoption of the U.N. Charter, there had been only a 
handful of instances in which States pursued ongoing military operations 
against non-state actors in the territory of other States.  A survey of 
such actions would include the American military expedition into 
Mexico in 1916, which was provoked by attacks on American territory 
by the armed bands of Franciso (Poncho) Villa; the American military 
attack on pirates using Spanish-held Amelia Island off the Florida coast 
as a base of operations in 1817; and the 1838 Caroline incident, in which 
Britain attacked a steamer in order to prevent an attack by non-State 
actors on Canada. See Roy S. Schöndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: 
Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
1, 2 n. 6 (2004). 
121. State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm [ https://perma.cc/Y4HZ-
597S]. 
122. Olumide K. Obayemi, Legal Standards Governing Pre-Emptive Strikes 
and Forcible Measures of Anticipatory Self-Defense under the U.N. 
Charter and General International Law, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 19, 24 (2006). 
123. Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September 11th: 
State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 26 (2003). 
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allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim 
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”124 The 
fatwa further called on “every Muslim who believes in God and wishes 
to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and 
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.”125 
Subsequent events proved that bin Laden’s al-Qaeda was not a 
mere group of crackpots, making grandiose proclamations of war, but 
a well-funded, well-organized, and deadly new terrorist organization 
with franchise cells across the globe.126 The targets of al-Qaeda attacks 
have included U.S. forces in Yemen in 1992, the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000, and 
the simultaneous attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon 
on September 11, 2001.127 The death toll from September 11th was 
over 3,000, which is higher than that of the American casualties in the 
War of 1812, the U.S.-Mexican War, or the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor in 1941.128 Aside from the human casualties, the economic 
damage to the United States has been estimated at over $630 
billion.129 Al-Qaeda attacks after 9/11 have included the November 
2003 truck bombings in Istanbul which injured 700 and killed 74 
people, the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid which injured 1,800 
and killed 191 people, and the July 2005 train and bus bombings in 
London which injured 700 and killed 56 people.130 
The 9/11 attacks forced States to reevaluate the long-standing 
notion that only a State has the capacity to commit an armed attack 
against another State giving rise to the right to respond with force in 
self-defense. Post-9/11, terrorist threats come from stateless entities 
that possess many of the attributes of a state: wealth, willing forces, 
training, organization, and potential access to weapons of mass 
destruction. If such a non-state actor commits a series of attacks 
against a State, and the acts are of sufficient scale and effect to 
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130. Paul Carsten, Al-Qaeda attacks in Europe since September 11, 
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amount to an armed attack, then arguably force in self-defense should 
be permitted against the non-state actor that presents a continuing 
threat where the host State has manifested an inability or 
unwillingness to respond effectively to the threat. 
2. The International Response to 9/11 
The day after the 9/11 attacks, the United States informed the 
UN Security Council that it had been the victim of an armed attack 
and declared its intent to respond under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.131 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the 
first time in its history invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which treats an armed attack on one member as an armed 
attack on all of them.132 The Organization of American States (OAS) 
took a similar stance in OAS Resolution 797. Invoking the 1947 Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which provides that in the 
event of an armed attack on an American State, the Parties agreed 
that “each one of [them] undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in 
the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense,”133 the OAS called upon “the government of the member 
States and all other governments to use all necessary means at their 
disposal to pursue, capture, and punish those responsible for the 
attacks, and to prevent additional attacks.”134 Meanwhile the United 
States and Australia jointly invoked the collective defense article of 
the ANZUS Treaty, which provides for the parties to collectively 
“resist armed attack” and “act to meet the common danger.”135 In 
addition, the Japanese government took the position that the 
September 11th attack was an attack on the United States, and soon 
thereafter enacted legislation to enable Japan to deploy its forces in 
support of U.S. operations against al-Qaeda.136 
 
131. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4730 mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. S.PV. 4370 
(September 12, 2001) (Statement of Ambassador James B. Cunningham, 
U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations on September 12, 
2001).  
132. Brown, supra note 123, at 28. 
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No. 1,838. 
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of America, arts. II and IV, Sept. 1, 1951, T.I.A.S. 2493. 
136. Brown, supra note 123, at 29 (citing Government of Japan, Ministerial 
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Consistent with these developments, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1368, which condemned the 9/11 attacks and 
“recognize[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
in accordance with the Charter.”137 This action was not a Chapter VII 
authorization to use force, but rather a confirmation that the United 
States could invoke its right to respond with force under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, despite the fact that al-Qaeda was a non-state actor. 
Consistent with that right, on October 7, 2001, the United States 
informed the Council that it had launched Operation Enduring 
Freedom.138 Air strikes were directed at camps allegedly belonging to 
al-Qaeda and other Taliban military targets throughout Afghanistan. 
There was no international protest or condemnation of the 
operation;139 rather, through word and actions, a long list of States 
expressed support for the operation.140 
Had al-Qaeda been a State, its attacks (both in the aggregate but 
also some of the most spectacular individual attacks) would have 
passed the “scale and effect” test of the Nicaragua Case. But as a 
non-state actor based in Afghanistan, under the Nicaragua precedent, 
use of force against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan would only be 
permissible if the Taliban government of Afghanistan had “effective 
control” of the terrorist organization.141 
Many commentators believe that Afghanistan met the Nicaragua 
test of effective control because the Taliban and al-Qaeda were in 
effect partners.142 Yet, the facts do not establish that al-Qaeda acted 
as an agent or instrumentality of the Afghan State, but rather that 
al-Qaeda pursued an independent agenda and acted autonomously 
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within Afghanistan.143 Neither did the Taliban government of 
Afghanistan endorse the September 11th attacks.144 Rather, Taliban 
officials denied that bin Laden had anything to do with the attack, 
asserting that “bin Laden lacked the capability to pull off large-scale 
attacks,” and proclaiming their confidence that a U.S. investigation 
would find him innocent.145 
On the other hand, the Taliban government knowingly harbored 
al-Qaeda, providing its members a place of refuge and allowing the 
organization to use Afghanistan as a base from which to plan, 
sponsor, and launch international terrorist operations.146 The Taliban 
government repeatedly ignored the Security Council’s demands to 
close down the terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan and 
extradite bin Laden, thereby enabling al-Qaeda to represent a 
continuing threat to the United States.147 
3. The Bush Doctrine 
A week after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States 
announced the “Bush Doctrine“ when President George Bush 
declared: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not 
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach 
has been found, stopped and defeated. . . . Either you are with us or 
you are with the terrorists.”148 The most important aspect of the 
Doctrine was encapsulated in Bush’s statement that “we will make no 
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those 
who harbor them.”149 In a speech before a joint session of Congress on  
143. ALEX STRICK VAN LINSCHOTON & FELIX KUEHN, AN ENEMY WE 
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AFGHANISTAN 1990-2010 (C. Hurst & Co., 2012). 
144. See Bill Roggio, Afghan Taliban claims it ‘had no hand in the 9/11 
incident’,  LONG WAR J. (SEPTEMBER 11, 2012), 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/09/afghan_taliban_clai
m.php [https://perma.cc/5NTW-F4CC] (writing that “The Afghan 
Taliban released a statement denying responsibility for the Sept. 11, 
2001 attacks on the US and claimed the group would not allow 
Afghanistan to be “be used to harm anyone.”). 
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147. S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 13 (Dec. 8, 1998); S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 1-2 (Oct. 15, 
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http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ 
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September 20, 2001, President Bush said, “[f]rom this day forward, 
any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be 
regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”150 
In the words of White House spokesman Ari Fleisher, the Bush 
Doctrine represented “a dramatic change in American policy.”151 Yet, 
in a five-day debate in the United Nations General Assembly, where 
State after State condemned the 9/11 attacks, not one objection was 
voiced to the newly announced U.S. policy.152 
Although it represented a clear departure from the Nicaragua 
Case, the Bush Doctrine was rooted in historic provenance. The 
general affirmative obligation that every State not knowingly allow 
“its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
States” was first articulated by the International Court of Justice in 
the 1949 Corfu Channel Case.153 There, the ICJ held Albania liable 
for damage to British warships that struck mines in Albanian 
territorial waters.154 Although Great Britain could not prove that 
Albania had laid the mines or had engaged another State to do so, the 
ICJ found that Albania must have known of the existence of the 
mines because Albania was known to have jealously guarded its side 
of the Corfu Strait, and this was enough to establish Albania’s 
liability.155 
This principle is analogous to the rules relating to neutrality 
adopted in the Hague Convention (V) some one hundred years ago.156 
According to the Hague Convention, “neutral powers” may not 
permit belligerents to move troops, munitions, or supplies across their 
territory, nor may they allow their territory to be used to form “corps 
of combatants” nor “recruiting agencies.”157 Should the neutral State 
prove unwilling or unable to uphold these proscriptions, the other 
belligerent State is justified in attacking the enemy forces in the 
territory of the neutral State.158 
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The application of this concept to terrorism was arguably 
confirmed by Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted shortly after 
September 11, 2001.159 In reaffirming the right of self-defense in the 
context of the September 11 attacks while at the same time stating 
that States are prohibited from allowing their territory from being 
used as a safe haven for terrorist groups, the resolution suggests that 
allowing known terrorists to operate freely in their territory triggers 
the right to self-defense against the non-State actors located within 
the host State’s territory. 
Summing up what he considered to be the current state of 
international law, UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston stated: “A 
targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second 
State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty [where] the first, 
targeting State has a right under international law to use force in self-
defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, [and] the second State is 
unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first State 
launched from its territory.”160 The fact that the “unwilling or unable“ 
test has its roots in the customary law of neutrality anchors the test’s 
legitimacy as applied to use of force in self-defense against non-state 
actors present in a foreign country.161 
The extent of permissible military action used to combat 
terrorists in a country unwilling or unable to control them depends on 
the level of support provided by the harboring State. Consistent with 
the Hague Convention (V) discussed above, with its precept of 
proportionality, “[i]f a State does nothing but allow terrorists to 
operate from its territory, providing no meaningful support, the 
extent of the permissible military force is only that which is necessary 
to deal with the terrorist threat itself. Neither the military of the 
harboring State nor its infrastructure is a permissible target.”162 In 
such case, there is a distinction between using force in a State and 
using force against the state itself.163 A swift, precision strike against 
terrorists or their training facilities in the territorial State (a so-called 
“in and out operation”) represents a reasonably limited interference 
with the territorial integrity or political independence of the territorial 
 
159. S.C.Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. (Sept. 28, 2001). 
160. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter 
Study on Targeted Killings]. 
161. See Deeks, supra note 9, at 497. 
162. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 107, at 112. 
163. NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 36 (Vaughan Lowe, Dan Sarooshi & Stefan Talmon eds., 2010). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law 
32 
State under these circumstances.164 The use of force against the non-
state actor taken in self-defense is a lawful use of force, and the 
territorial State cannot therefore mount a forcible resistance in the 
name of its own self-defense.165 If, on the other hand, the territorial 
State is implicated in the terrorist attack, then the victim State may 
have the right to use force against the territorial State and its agents, 
in addition to using it against the non-state actor.166 
A more controversial aspect of the Bush Doctrine was its 
assertion of an expanded right of anticipatory self-defense against 
terrorist threats. In the National Security Strategy issued in the 
aftermath of 9/11, President Bush explained: 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need 
not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to 
defend themselves against forces that present an imminent 
danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often 
conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an 
imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, 
navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries. Rogue States and terrorists do not seek to 
attack us using conventional means … Instead, they rely on acts 
of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass 
destructions – weapons that can easily be concealed, delivered 
covertly and used without warning. The United States has long 
maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, 
the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
the uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to 
preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as 
a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of 
civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most 
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destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle 
while dangers gather.167 
As depicted in the National Security Strategy, the Bush Doctrine 
did not just advocate anticipatory self-defense, (striking an enemy as 
it prepares an attack), but also “preventive self-defense“ (striking an 
enemy even in the absence of specific evidence of an imminent 
attack). To that end, the Bush Administration implemented a policy 
of targeted killing of key al-Qaeda figures in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere.168 
This expansion of the anticipatory self-defense concept was seen 
as warranted by the unique attributes of the continuing threat posed 
by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization.169 “Al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
are well funded with access to deadly means, potentially including 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. They attack without 
warning, target civilians indiscriminately, and employ suicide missions 
on a regular basis. They had committed a series of prior attacks 
against the United States and publicly announced an intention to 
continue to attack in the future.”170 Arguably under these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to deem an attack by such 
organizations as “continuing” or “always imminent” for purposes of 
the Caroline standard.171 
“In implementing the Bush Doctrine, the United States began to 
employ newly developed technology in the form of unmanned 
Predator drones equipped with laser-guided Hellfire missiles controlled 
by operators located thousands of miles away.”172 Predator drones 
eliminate the risk to U.S. pilots. They are capable of remaining in the 
air ten times longer and cost about one-twentieth as much as combat 
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aircraft.173 Because they are slow and vulnerable to signal jamming, 
the drones are not perceived to be a serious threat to an advanced 
military, but they are ideal for use against non-state actors in failed 
or struggling States.174 The first drone strike outside Afghanistan 
occurred in 2002 in Yemen, killing alleged al-Qaeda leader Ali Aaed 
Senyan al-Harithi and four other men.175 
When it came into office, the Obama Administration embraced 
the Bush Doctrine’s “unable and unwilling” principle, and relied on it 
in significantly expanding the drone targeted killing program.176 
According to President Obama’s CIA Director, Leon Panetta, due to 
their precision and effectiveness, drones have become “the only game 
in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda 
leadership.”177 
The Obama Administration’s State Department Legal Adviser, 
Harold Koh, delivered a major policy speech at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of International Law on March 25, 2010, in 
which he provided the legal justification for the Administration’s use 
of drones to fight terrorist groups around the world. Koh began by 
stressing that the attacks of 9/11 triggered the U.S. right of self-
defense against al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Echoing 
the Bush Administration’s characterization of a “global war” against 
Al-Qaeda,178 Koh asserted “as a matter of international law, the 
United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the 
Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, 
and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense 
under international law.”179 Some commentators have argued that the 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda must be limited to territory on which 
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the threshold of violence for an armed conflict is currently occurring, 
which at the time of this writing would include Afghanistan, parts of 
Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq.180 Koh’s broader formulation 
recognizes that the limited approach would effectively create 
sanctuaries for terrorist organizations in failed and weak States such 
as Somalia and Sudan.181 
Next, Koh argued that the right to use force in self-defense 
against al-Qaeda was continuous in light of the continuous threat 
presented: “As recent events have shown, al-Qaeda has not 
abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed 
continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the 
United States has the authority under international law, and the 
responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to 
defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al-
Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.”182 But then Koh walked 
back somewhat from the conception of preventive war enshrined in 
the Bush Doctrine, saying: “Of course, whether a particular individual 
will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon 
considerations specific to each case, including those related to the 
imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other States involved, 
and the willingness and ability of those States to suppress the threat 
the target poses.”183 
Two years later, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder provided 
further details about the Obama Administration’s criteria for 
authorizing a targeted killing. According to Holder, authorization 
would require three findings: “First, the U.S. government has 
determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual 
poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; 
second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation would be 
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war 
principles.”184 
Until now, we’ve been examining principles related to jus ad 
bellum (the lawfulness of the resort to force). Attorney General 
Holder’s statement reminds us that a forcible response to terrorists 
must also comply with the fundamental rules of jus in bello (the 
lawfulness of the means employed and target selected). In his speech 
before the American Society of International Law, Harold Koh 
described the applicable jus in bello principles as “first, the principle 
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of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military 
objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object 
of the attack; and second, the principle of proportionality, which 
prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”185 
Koh’s description assumes that the high-level members of al-
Qaeda themselves are lawful targets. Since they are not part of a 
military, the laws of war would treat al-Qaeda members 
presumptively as civilians who are immune from targeting unless they 
either “directly participate in the hostilities” or take on a “continuous 
combat function” within the group.186 In May 29, 2009, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross published a study entitled 
“Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,” whose aim was in 
part to define when targeted killings of members of terrorist groups 
would be consistent with International Humanitarian Law.187 The 
Interpretive Guidance states that “individuals whose continuous 
function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or 
operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities assume a 
continuous combat function.”188 The targeted killings to date appear 
to involve al-Qaeda figures that would meet this description.189 
Meanwhile, there has been little protest as other States have 
begun to cite the U.S. response to al-Qaeda to justify their own acts 
against terrorist groups operating from neighboring States. Examples 
include: 
The April 2002 killing by Russian armed forces of “Chechen 
rebel warlord” Omar Ibn al Khattab.190 
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The February 2008 offensive by Turkish forces against PKK 
bases in northern Iraq.191 
The March 2008, airstrike by Colombia against a FARC 
terrorist camp just inside Ecuador’s border, killing the FARC’s 
second-in-command, Raul Reyes.192  
The December 2006 use of force by Ethiopian armed forces 
against the “Islamic Courts” terrorist group which had been 
conducting a series of cross-border attacks from Somalia.193 
The May 2011 mission by U.S. Navy Seals to kill Osama bin 
Laden at his secret compound in northern Pakistan on a mission 
to kill bin Laden.194 
The September 2011 Predator drone attack by the United 
States that killed U.S. national Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen.195 
The October 2011 Kenyan incursion into Somalia in response 
to cross-border attacks by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group.196 
C. A Grotian Moment that was Still One Case Away 
Some scholars have opined that “the attack of September 11th and 
the American response represent a new paradigm in the international 
law relating to the use of force.”197 They base this conclusion on the 
statements of the United States, NATO, the OAS, and other States 
that 9/11 constituted an armed attack by al-Qaeda which warranted 
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force in self-defense; Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
confirming the right to use self-defense in the context of the 9/11 
attacks; the international community’s positive reaction to the United 
States invasion of Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda and topple its 
Taliban supporters; and finally the UN Special Rapporteur’s 
conclusion that force in self-defense could be used against terrorist 
groups operating in the territory of States unwilling or unable to 
control them.198 They argue that the reaction to 9/11 thus broke with 
the conception of Article 51 as a State-centered norm. 
Moreover, the protracted quest of the international community to 
arrive at a consensus definition of terrorism got a substantial boost in 
2011 when the Appeals Chamber of the Security Council-created 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)199 concluded that “although it is 
held by many scholars and other legal experts that no widely accepted 
definition of terrorism has evolved in the world society because of the 
marked difference of views on some issues, closer scrutiny reveals that 
in fact such a definition has gradually emerged.”200 Based on its 
extensive review of state practice and indicators of opinio juris (a 
sense of legal obligation), the Appeals Chamber declared that the 
customary international law definition of terrorism consists of “the 
following three key elements: (i) the perpetration of a criminal act 
(such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or 
threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the 
population (which would generally entail the creation of public 
danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international 
authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when 
the act involves a transnational element.”201 The STL’s definition of 
terrorism, together with the listing of terrorist groups and individuals 
by the Security Council’s sanctions committee,202 removed one of the 
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greatest obstacles to use of force against terrorists, namely the 
argument that “one man’s terrorist was another man’s freedom 
fighter.” 
As one commentator asserted, “the Bush Doctrine, first 
proclaimed by the U.S. in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2011, became an instant custom during the days and 
weeks following the attacks.”203 Yet, 9/11 is better characterized as a 
Grotian Moment that was, until the 2015 ISIS attacks, still one step 
away from coming to fruition. The problem is that the Bush 
Administration’s assertion that there is no difference between 
terrorists and States that harbor them,204 and its assertion of a right 
to preventive self-defense against such States,205 was unnecessarily 
broad and lacking nuance. A State may, for example, harbor a few 
terrorists or serve as the organization’s headquarters. The terrorist 
group may be poorly armed or possess weapons of mass destruction. 
The State may provide the terrorists funding, passports, training, and 
intelligence, or may simply be acquiescing to their presence or too 
weak to quash them. The Bush Doctrine provides no guidance on how 
these different scenarios should be treated. Concern that the 
imprecision of the Bush Doctrine would lead to assertions by other 
States to justify aggression in the name of self-defense prompted 
pushback which came in the form of two post-9/11 cases decided by 
the International Court of Justice. 
In its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Wall, the ICJ rejected the 
Israeli claim to self-defense on the reasoning that self-defense under 
Article 51 is not available to Israel against non-state actors operating 
on territories under the control of Israel.206 Then, in the 2005 Armed 
Activities in the Congo Case, the ICJ required the responsibility of 
the Congo for the attacks of Ugandan rebels operating from the 
Congolese territory in order to find Uganda’s right to self-defense 
lawful.207 These cases signaled the ICJ’s “determination to counter a 
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more permissive reading of Article 51” brought on by the 
international community’s reaction to 9/11.208 
Scholars and certain members of the International Court of 
Justice have been highly critical of the ICJ’s continued insistence 
after 9/11 that self-defense is only available in cases where the attack 
by non-state actors can be attributed to the territorial state. Scholars 
point out that the ICJ holdings are inconsistent with the wellspring of 
the customary law on self-defense, the Caroline case, which confirmed 
that anticipatory force in self-defense was lawful against non-State 
actors whose conduct was not attributable to a State.209 Writing 
separately in the Wall case, Judge Higgins said, “There is, with 
respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-
defense is available only when an armed attack is made by a State.”210 
Similarly, writing separately in the Congo Case, Judge Koojimans 
noted that in the era of al-Qaeda, it is “unreasonable to deny the 
attacked State the right to self-defense merely because there is no 
attacker State.”211 Judge Simma similarly concluded in his separate 
opinion in the Congo case that “Security Council resolutions 1368 
(2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but be read as affirmations of the view 
that large-scale attacks by non-State actors can qualify as ‘armed 
attacks’ within the meaning of Article 51.”212 
While the International Court of Justice’s Wall and Congo 
decisions may have put breaks on the rapidly crystallizing customary 
international law concerning use of force against non-state actors, 
they did not ultimately prevent the new rule from emerging. This is 
in part due to the fact that the situation in the Wall and Congo cases 
are distinguishable from that of a State using force against terrorists 
operating in a foreign State. In the Wall Ccase, the ICJ stressed that 
the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter only 
applied to attacks emanating from another State and did not apply to 
attacks coming from within the Occupied Territories, because the area 
was controlled by Israel.213 In Congo, as in Nicaragua, the use of force 
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was not limited to attacking the terrorist group itself, but involved 
widespread attacks throughout the territorial state. 
The case study of use of force against non-state actors in the 
aftermath of 9/11 indicates how international courts are capable of 
setting back (as well as catalyzing) the formation of customary 
international law during a potential Grotian Moment. In light of these 
conflicting currents, the law could not be said to have been settled on 
the eve of the U.S. military action against ISIS in Syria in 2014. But, 
as described below, events during 2015 provided the tipping point 
necessary to crystallize the new approach to the right of self-defense. 
D. 2014: The Initial U.S. justifications for bombing ISIS 
How a custom pioneer describes a new rule of customary 
international law can greatly impact its international acceptance. 
Before settling on collective self-defense as its primary argument, the 
U.S. officials tried out a variety of alternative legal arguments to 
justify using force in Syria.  None of these were well received by the 
international community. 
1. Humanitarian Intervention 
The first U.S. argument was that airstrikes against ISIS were 
justified under the right of humanitarian intervention in the context 
of efforts to save 30,000 Yazadis trapped on Mount Sinjar.214 The 
United States could have cited as precedent for this the NATO 
airstrikes against Serbia in an effort to prevent ethnic cleansing of 
Kosovar Albanians in 1999. But, as explained below, the United 
States has been reluctant to advocate a general right of humanitarian 
intervention, and has instead argued that the NATO airstrikes were 
sui generis. The United States described its actions to save the 
Yazadis in similarly narrow terms. 
Kosovo was a Serbian province where the population was ninety 
percent ethnic Albanian Muslims and ten percent Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Christians.215 In 1998, purportedly in response to the threat 
posed by Kosovar insurgents, Serb military and security forces 
launched a series of attacks that appeared intended to ethnically 
cleanse the region. In March216 and October217 1998, the UN Security 
Council passed resolutions condemning Serb abuses in Kosovo, but 
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the Security Council resolutions did not authorize the use of force, 
and Russia made it clear that it would veto any attempt to do so.218 
Nevertheless, after peace negotiations broke down in March 1999, 
NATO decided to launch a series of aerial attacks against military 
and strategic targets in Serbia with the intent to persuade the Serbian 
Government, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, to comply with the 
Security Council’s Resolutions.219 Following the massacres of Kosovars 
in Drenica, Gornje Obrinje, and Racak, the NATO States had come 
to the conclusion that unless action was taken a humanitarian 
catastrophe would unfold, potentially eclipsing that of Bosnia.220 The 
bombing campaign, called “Operation Allied Force,” involved 912 
aircraft, which flew a total of 37,225 bombing missions.221 A 
significant feature of the Kosovo incident is the purity of the actors’ 
motives: “[t]here were no strategic or material interests of NATO 
nations in Kosovo.”222 
In explaining its decision to issue an Activation Order to use 
NATO force in the Kosovo crisis, the North Atlantic Council stated, 
“[T]he unrestrained assault by Yugoslav military, police and 
paramilitary forces, under the direction of President Milosevic, on 
Kosovar civilians has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe, 
which also threatens to destabilize the surrounding region … These 
extreme and criminally irresponsible policies, which cannot be 
defended on any grounds, have made necessary and justify the 
military action by NATO.”223 
In the early days of the bombing campaign, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair explained the humanitarian justification for the 
action. “This is not . . . a battle for NATO; this is not a battle for 
territory; this is a battle for humanity. This is a just cause, it is a 
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rightful cause.”224 When pressed in parliament for the legal rationale 
for the NATO bombing campaign, Blair’s Secretary for Defense, 
George Robertson, provided the following elucidation: “Our legal 
justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used 
in extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Those 
circumstances clearly existed in Kosovo. The use of force in such 
circumstances can be justified as an exceptional measure in support of 
purposes laid down by the Security Council, but without the 
Council’s express authorization, when that is the only means to avert 
an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”225 
Similar statements were issued by the Canadian and Dutch 
Ambassadors. The Canadian Ambassador claimed that 
“‘[h]umanitarian considerations underpin our action. We cannot 
simply stand by while innocents are murdered, an entire population is 
displaced, [and] villages are burned.’”226 While, the Dutch Ambassador 
acknowledged:  
[T]hat his government would always prefer to base action on a 
specific Security Council resolution when taking up arms to 
defend human rights, but if ‘due to one or two permanent 
members’ rigid interpretation of the concept of domestic 
jurisdiction such a resolution is not attainable, we cannot sit 
back and simply let the humanitarian catastrophe occur.’ 
Rather, he concluded, “we will act on the legal basis we have 
available, and what we have available in this case is more than 
adequate.”227 
On March 25, Russia sponsored a draft resolution in the Security 
Council that sought to condemn the NATO action as an unlawful act 
in violation of the UN Charter.228 According to the Russian 
Delegation, the vote was to be a choice between law and 
lawlessness.229 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
chaired by the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Richard Goldstone, would later 
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conclude that the 1999 NATO intervention was “illegal but 
legitimate.”230 But during the Security Council debate, the NATO 
States did not take the position that the airstrikes were illegal but 
morally justified. Rather, they argued that their action had the 
backing of international law.231 In the end, the proposed resolution 
was defeated by twelve votes to three, with only China and Namibia 
joining Russia in support of the measure.232 Voting in opposition were 
the five NATO members on the Security Council (the United 
Kingdom, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United States), 
joined by Argentina, Bahrain, Gabon, the Gambia, Malaysia, and 
Slovenia.233 The sizable rejection of the draft resolution indicated that 
there was a broad base of support for the NATO action. Outside of 
the Council, NATO’s intervention was endorsed by the European 
Union, the Organization of Islamic States, and by the Organization of 
American States.234 Moreover, key States in the area, including 
Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria, granted NATO access to their air 
space for Operation Allied Force, transforming their support into 
action.235 Other than Russia, China, and India, there was virtually no 
State protest of the NATO action across the globe.236 
After seventy-eight days, the NATO bombing campaign 
ultimately succeeded in driving Milosevic back to the negotiating 
table, where he signed an agreement providing autonomy for Kosovo 
under the temporary administration of the United Nations and 
protection of NATO forces. Subsequently, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999, which some have 
interpreted as providing a sort of after-the-fact ratification of 
Operation Allied Force. The resolution “put in place the foundations 
for the international civil and security presence in Kosovo that 
accompanied the end of hostilities.”237 
In the 1986 Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice 
observed that “[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an 
unprecedented exception to the principle [of non-intervention] might, 
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if shared in principle by other States, tend toward a modification of 
customary international law.”238 Prior to the 1999 NATO bombing 
campaign, there had been several cases where foreign intervention was 
employed to halt widespread atrocities without Security Council 
approval. Hence, India stopped the slaughter in East Pakistan in 
1971, Tanzania ended Idi Amin‘s mass killing in Uganda in 1978, and 
Vietnam’s intervention brought an end to Pol Pot‘s killing fields in 
Cambodia in 1979.239 But unlike the 1999 Kosovo intervention, in 
these three cases, self-defense, rather than humanitarian concern, was 
the primary justification asserted.240 The fact that the intervening 
States relied on self-defense, rather than asserting a right to 
humanitarian intervention, undermined arguments that the law had 
changed. Moreover, in the cases of India and Vietnam, only a Soviet 
veto prevented the Security Council from condemning the actions as 
violations of international law.241 
In contrast to these situations, in the case of the 1999 NATO 
intervention in Serbia, a major application of armed force had taken 
place for humanitarian purposes without Security Council 
authorization but with widespread support by the international 
community. According to one scholar, the NATO intervention was “a 
case that expanded, rather than breached, the law, similar to the 
Truman proclamation about the continental shelf.”242 Others have 
described the NATO intervention as “a watershed event” and “an 
important transition point in the shift from one international order to 
the next.”243 Moreover, the NATO intervention led to the articulation 
of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, a concept that has 
been described as the “most dramatic normative development of our 
time”244 and a “revolution in consciousness in international affairs.”245 
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The rapid acceptance of the R2P doctrine within a few short 
years of the NATO intervention renders this development a potential 
candidate for recognition as a Grotian Moment.  The 2001 ICISS 
Report characterized the responsibility to protect as “an emerging 
principle of customary international law,”246 and the 2005 High-level 
Panel Report described it as an “emerging norm,”247 an assessment 
shared by the Secretary-General.248 The R2P Doctrine was then 
unanimously endorsed at the 2005 World Summit by the Heads of 
State and Government of every UN Member State, and later by the 
United Nations Security Council.249 Based on these developments, 
Professor Ved Nanda of Denver University School of Law argues that 
a government can no longer “hide behind the shield of sovereignty, 
claiming non-intervention by other States in its internal affairs, if it 
fails to protect the people under its jurisdiction from massive 
violations of human rights.”250 Yet, two roadblocks prevented 
humanitarian intervention outside the framework of the United 
Nations from actually ripening into a norm of customary international 
law. 
The first impediment was the ambiguity of the initial 
manifestation of opinio juris  that accompanied the acts of the NATO 
States. The participating NATO States were not comfortable with the 
idea that the bombing campaign would create a new rule of 
customary international law justifying a broad notion of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. Thus, in July 1999, U.S. Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright stressed that the air strikes were a “unique 
situation sui generis in the region of the Balkans,” concluding that it 
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was important “not to overdraw the various lessons that come out of 
it.”251 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had earlier suggested that 
humanitarian interventions might become more common,252 
subsequently retreated from that position, emphasizing the 
exceptional nature of the Kosovo operation.253 
The reason for the reluctance of the United States and United 
Kingdom to acknowledge a precedent that could ripen into customary 
international law was explained by Michael Matheson, the Acting 
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State at the time of the 
intervention, in the following terms: 
About six months before the actual conflict, at the time when 
NATO was considering giving an order to threaten the use of 
force, the political community of NATO got together and had a 
discussion about what the basis of such threat of force would be. 
At the end of the discussion, it was clear that there was no 
common agreement on what might be the justification. There 
were some NATO members who were prepared to base it on a 
new doctrine of humanitarian intervention; but most members 
of the NATO Council were reluctant to adopt a relatively open-
ended new doctrine. So at the end of that week, the NATO 
political community said, here is a list of all of the important 
reasons why it is necessary for us to threaten the use of force. 
And at the bottom, it said that under these unique 
circumstances, we think such actions would be legitimate. There 
was deliberate evasion of making a “legal” assertion. 
And this same process occurred in the U.S. Government. There 
were some who wanted to articulate that humanitarian 
intervention in now the basis for U.S. action. There was another 
theory from the Department of Defense, which wanted to adopt 
sort of an expanded idea of self-defense based on the general 
interest of the United States in the region; but on reflection, 
nobody was really prepared to throw all the eggs into either of 
those baskets. So we ended up with a formulation similar to 
that of NATO, where we listed all of the reasons why we were 
taking action and, in the end, mumbled something about its 
being justifiable and legitimate but not a precedent. So in a 
sense, it was something less than a definitive legal rationale—
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although it probably was taken by large parts of the public 
community as something like that.254 
When the principal State actors assert that their actions are sui 
generis and not intended to constitute precedent, this does not create 
a favorable climate for the cultivation of a new rule of customary 
international law.255 
The formation of the new customary rule of humanitarian 
intervention hit a second obstruction when the 2004 High-Level Panel 
Report, which was endorsed by the UN Secretary-General, and the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which was endorsed by the 
General Assembly and Security Council, were written to reflect a 
much narrower conception in which humanitarian intervention is only 
lawful when authorized by the Security Council. 256 
It is for these reasons that the United States likely chose not to 
pursue the humanitarian intervention rationale beyond the rescue of 
the Yazadis from Mount Sanjar, despite the fact that, according to 
Security Council Resolution 2170 (2014), ISIS was engaged in the 
commission of “continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of 
human rights.”257  
2. Failed State 
A second U.S. argument was that airstrikes against ISIS “are in a 
part of Syria that is currently outside the authority of the Syrian 
government” and thus “in our eyes, a legal no-man’s land.”258 The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said ISIS has “to be addressed 
on both sides of what is essentially at this point a nonexistent 
border.”259 This proposition is based on the view that limited use of  
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force in the territory of a failed State would not violate the state’s 
territorial integrity because a failed state by definition does not 
exercise meaningful control over its borders or territory.260 
The U.S. argument constituted a radical departure from the 
traditional view that a State’s legal personality, rights, and 
responsibilities do not evaporate when it loses control over parts of its 
territory, as during periods of civil war, insurgency, or governmental 
collapse.261 The United States quickly recognized that the failed state 
argument would prove problematic to U.S. interests and global 
stability. A new rule of customary international law that would allow 
states to invade their neighbors whenever they deem that “state 
failure” has occurred would create a “legion of loopholes” in the U.N. 
Charter,262 and create substantial potential for abuse. 
This is because, according to the Fund for Peace, which publishes 
the annual “Fragile States Index,” there are some fifteen countries in 
addition to Syria that could be considered failed or failing States 
based on extensive areas within their borders outside government 
control.263 These include Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Chad, Yemen, Afghanistan, Guinea, Haiti, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe.264 The U.S. 
argument would have constituted a virtual license for neighboring 
States to invade these countries. 
3. Hot Pursuit 
Perhaps the most ill-conceived of the U.S. arguments was put 
forth by Secretary of State John Kerry, who testified before the 
Senate that since ISIS attacks Iraq from and then retreats to Syria, a 
“right of hot pursuit” could provide a basis for military force against 
ISIS in Syria.265 
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While there is a recognized right of hot pursuit to pursue ships 
escaping in international waters, there is no authority for application 
of the doctrine to forces on land.266 Nevertheless, the United States 
has made the argument in the past, for example in relation to Maj. 
Gen. John Pershing’s expeditionary force of 4,800 troops “to pursue 
Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa in 1916 into Mexican territory,” 
in relation to the bombing of Cambodia and Laos in 1969 to pursue 
Viet Cong who crossed into their territory from Vietnam, and in 
relation to pursuing Taliban forces from Afghanistan into Pakistan in 
2007.267 
Notably, these historic incidents were met with widespread 
protest and condemnation. In addition, the International Court of 
Justice implicitly rejected the hot pursuit argument in holding in the 
Congo Case that Ugandan forces acting under “Operation Safe 
Haven” could not lawfully cross into the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to hunt down anti-Ugandan rebel groups that had taken refuge 
there.268 Moreover, if accepted, this land-based hot pursuit rationale 
could create a slippery slope, leading to frequent border violations by 
many other states around the globe.269 
Thus, the United States ultimately settled on the argument that 
use of force against ISIS in Syria could be justified because Syria was 
unable to control the threat ISIS posed to Iraq and other countries, 
including the United States. The argument was significantly 
strengthened by events in late 2015. 
E. 2015: The Grotian Moment comes to Fruition  
In the aftermath of the ISIS bombing of a Russian jetliner over 
the Sinai desert on October 31, 2015, and ISIS attacks on a Paris 
stadium and concert hall on November 13, 2015,   the U.N. Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2249, which determined that 
ISIS is “a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and 
security,” and called for “all necessary measures” to “eradicate the 
safe haven [ISIS] established” in Syria.270   
The October 31 and November 13 ISIS attacks were a game 
changer, killing and injuring over 824 nationals of Russia, France, and 
twenty-two other countries. They showed that ISIS—the richest and 
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most technologically advanced terrorist organization in the world—
was no longer confining its objectives to territorial acquisition in Syria 
and Iraq, but had adopted the tactics of other terrorist groups, 
focusing on attacking vulnerable targets outside the Levant. 
Moreover, Russia was now just as much a target as the West. 
Resolution 2249 did not provide a new stand-alone legal basis or 
authorization for use of force against ISIS in Syria.271 Unlike past 
Security Council resolutions that have authorized force, Resolution 
2249 does not mention Article 42, or even Chapter VII, of the U.N. 
Charter, which is the Article and Chapter under which the Security 
Council can permit States to use force as an exception to Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter. Nor does the Resolution use the word 
“authorizes” or even “decides” in relation to use of force. These 
textual differences led Mark Weller, Professor of International Law at 
the University of Cambridge, to conclude that “this language suggests 
that the resolution does not grant any fresh authority for states 
seeking to take action.”272 
But the resolution does stand as a confirmation by the Security 
Council that use of force against ISIS in Syria is permissible. 
Importantly, the French Security Council Representative, who had 
sponsored Resolution 2249, stated in his explanation of vote on the 
resolution that “collective action could now be based on Article 51 
[self-defense] of the United Nations Charter.”273 With a unanimous 
confirmation, Resolution 2249 will play an important role in 
crystallizing the new rule of customary international law regarding 
use of force in self-defense against non-state actors—a phenomenon 
colorfully described by Professor David Koplow of Georgetown as 
“helping to midwife the development of new norms of customary 
international law.”274   
Any doubt of the importance of the Security Council Resolution 
was dispelled when a few days after its adoption the UK parliament 
voted on December 2, 2015 to approve (397-223) airstrikes against 
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ISIS in Syria despite the earlier views of many MPs that such action 
could not be legally justified.275 Immediately thereafter, the UK joined 
the United States in bombing ISIS targets throughout Syria.276 
V. Conclusion 
This article has examined whether the use of force against al-
Qaeda and ISIS during the past fourteen years has given rise to a so-
called Grotian Moment: an instance of rapid formation of a new rule 
of customary international law, in this case recognizing the right of 
States to attack non-state actors when the territorial State is unable 
or unwilling to suppress the threat they pose. Such a right would 
constitute a radical change from the prior-existing rule, which had 
required effective control of the non-state actors by the territorial 
State as a pre-condition to the use of force against them.   
Ordinarily, customary international law takes many decades to 
crystallize. In this context, fourteen years would constitute almost 
instant custom. Historically, there has been a series of other instances 
of so-called Grotian Moments, where a context of fundamental change 
served as an accelerating agent, enabling customary international law 
to form much more rapidly, and with less State practice, than is 
normally the case. Each represented a radical legal development. In 
each, the development was ushered in by the urgency of dealing with 
fundamental change. In some cases the change was the advent of new 
technology, as with offshore drilling and outer space flight. In others 
it was in the form of pervasive moral outrage regarding shocking 
revelations of crimes against humanity, as preceded the establishment 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the creation of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal. 
Both al-Qaeda and ISIS are widely viewed as representing a new 
kind of threat, in which a non-state actor possesses many of the 
attributes of a State: massive wealth, sophisticated training and 
organization, and access to destructive weaponry. To respond to the 
fundamental change presented by these uber-terrorist groups, the 
United States has argued that it is now lawful to attack such non-
state actors when they are present in States that are unable or 
unwilling to curb them. In light of the Security Council approval of 
the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to dislodge al-Qaeda and the 
absence of significant protest of the subsequent drone strikes against 
al-Qaeda leaders and operatives in Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, and 
 
275. Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, British Jets Hit ISIS in Syria After 
Parliament Authorizes Airstrikes, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, A16, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/world/europe/britain-
parliament-syria-airstrikes-vote.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/N472-
2RB6] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
276. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law 
53 
Yemen, international law seemed to be moving rapidly toward 
adoption of the “unable and unwilling” principle of self-defense. But 
in the 2004 Wall and 2005 Congo cases, the International Court of 
Justice reaffirmed that international law permits extraterritorial 
attacks against non-state actors only when their actions are 
attributable to the territorial state, utilizing an effective control 
standard. Despite widespread criticism of these holdings, including 
from some of the ICJ’s most respected members, these judicial 
decisions unquestionably set back the evolving customary 
international law of self-defense against non-state actors. 
This article concludes that the international community’s 
response to ISIS in Syria has provided the final push necessary to 
bring the Grotian Moment to fruition. The initial diversity of 
arguments articulated by the United States to justify its airstrikes 
was not a good start, and UN Security Council Resolution 2249 does 
not clearly endorse a particular legal justification.  Despite its 
ambiguity, Resolution 2249 will likely be viewed as confirming that 
use of force in self-defense is now permissible against non-state actors 
where the territorial state is unable to suppress the threat that they 
pose.  In the words of the Institute of International Law, “where a 
rule of customary law is (merely) emerging or there is still some doubt 
as to its status” a unanimous non-binding resolution of the General 
Assembly or Security Council “can consolidate the custom and 
remove doubts which might have existed.”277 
The implication of this newly accepted change in the international 
law of self-defense is that any State can now lawfully use force against 
non-state actors (terrorists, rebels, pirates, drug cartels, etc.) that are 
present in the territory of another State if the territorial State is 
unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by those non-state 
actors. The number of candidates for such action is quite large. The 
U.S. Department of State maintains a list of terrorist organizations 
that pose a significant threat to the United States and its allies 
around the world, which includes fifty-eight terrorist groups 
headquartered in thirty-five different countries (in addition to ISIS in 
Syria/Iraq).278 Importantly, the right to use force against such non-
state actors is subject to several limitations which will impede the 
possibility of abuse. First, the individual or aggregate actions of the 
non-state actors must amount to the equivalent of an armed attack to 
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trigger the right to use force in self-defense. Second, the use of force 
must be targeted against the non-state actors and not the State or its 
military unless the State is found to be in effective control of the non-
state actors. Third, military action must still meet the principles of 
necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. Further limitations are 
likely to develop in relation to international reaction to State 
invocation and application of the new rule. 
 
